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• Positive shocks to global liquidity significantly increase real oil prices.
• Global liquidity is important in rise in oil price since GFC.
• Liquidity significantly increases global oil production.
• Increased liquidity significantly increases global aggregate demand.
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a b s t r a c t
There have been substantial increases in liquidity in recent years and real oil prices have almost returned
to the high levels achieved before the global financial crisis. Unanticipated increases in global real M2 led
to statistically significant increases in real oil prices. The historical impact of global real M2 on the real
price of crude oil is important in the recovery of oil prices over 2009 to 2011.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Given that global liquidity has risen substantially in recent
years, the question arises ofwhether there has been spill-over from
liquidity to crude oil prices. There has been a substantial increase
in nominal M2 for the largest four economies from 13,500 billion
U.S. dollars in 1997 to 45,000 billion U.S. dollars in 2011. Real oil
prices have beenmuch higher over the last third of this period. The
spot price per barrel of West Texas Intermediate crude oil (WTI)
rose from $58.14 in January 2007 to $140 in June 2008. Concurrent
with the global financial crisis (GFC) and theweak global economy,
the spot price for WTI fell to $41.68 in January 2009. However, the
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Open access under CC BY license.spot price forWTI rebounded to $133.93 in April 2011while global
economic activity remained subdued.
Fig. 1 shows the monthly percentage change in real oil prices
and global real M2. Major changes in real oil prices are tracked
by changes in global real M2. A diversion in the series is observed
during the GFC. The sharpest monthly drops in real oil price occur
in the last three months of 2008. Over 1997–2011 the largest
monthly increase in real oil price occurs inMarch 2009. The largest
increase in global real M2 occurs in December 2008. The large
increases in global realM2 at the end of 2008 are in response to the
GFC and follow a series of small increases and decreases in global
real M2 from April to September 2008. It is shown in a historical
decomposition of structural shocks that from the middle of 2008
through 2009 global aggregate demand and oil-specific demand
shocks contribute to real oil price decline while shocks to global
real M2 contribute to recovery in real oil price. The null hypothesis
that global M2 does not Granger cause real oil prices is rejected at
least at the 10% level over a range of 1, 3 and 6 lags.
Belke et al. (2010) show that global liquidity has risen sharply
since 2001 and find significant impacts on an OECD commodity
134 R.A. Ratti, J.L. Vespignani / Economics Letters 121 (2013) 133–136Fig. 1. Monthly global real M2 vs. real oil price (series in log-difference form). Notes: GLOM2 is real M2 of the U.S., Eurozone, Japan and China. RP is real oil price. The price
of oil is WTI. Real values are obtained by dividing nominal values by the U.S. CPI.price index (dominated by oil with a weight of 63%). Anzuini
et al. (2012) find support for a significant (but small) effect of U.S.
monetary policy on oil prices from 1970–2008.2
In this paper we seek to determine the influence of structural
oil price shocks and liquidity as it arises from themajor economies
on the price of crude oil. A structural VARmodel is employed in the
analysis.
2. Methodology
Consider a structural vector autoregression model (SVAR) con-
structed with monthly data from 1997:1 to 2011:12, with the
following variables: global oil production (GOt), real aggregate
demand (ADt), real oil prices (RP t), and global real M2 in U.S. dol-
lars (GLOM2t).3 Global M2 is constructed by aggregating M2 in
U.S. dollars of the Eurozone, U.S., China and Japan. Monthly data
for China are available from 1997:1. (GOt),(RP t) and (GLOM2t) are
first different stationary variables.4 Real aggregate demand ismea-
sured by the index of global real economic activity constructed by
Kilian (2009) based on equal-weighted dry cargo freight rates. ADt
is stationary.
The SVAR model can expressed as:
B0Xt = β +
3
i=1
BiXt−i + εt , (1)
where three lags are determined by the Akaike Information Crite-
rion (AIC) and εt denotes the vector of serially andmutually uncor-
related structural innovations. The vector Xt can be expressed as
Xt = [△ log (GOt) , ADt ,△ log (RP t) ,△ log(GLOM2t)]. Model re-
strictions are based on Kilian (2009), to the extent possible, given
the inclusion in our model of the global M2. The identification re-
strictions on BoXt are imposed as follows:
BoXt =
1 0 0 0−b20 1 0 0−b30 −b31 1 0
−b40 −b41 −b42 1

 △ log(GOt)ADt△ log(RP t)
△ log(GLOM2t)
 (2)
3. Empirical results
3.1. Impulse response function results
Fig. 2 shows the responses of the variables in the SVAR to
one-standard deviation structural innovations. In the first column
2 Glick and Leduc (2012) do not find evidence of an effect of recent U.S. monetary
policy shocks (specifically quantitative easing) on commodity prices.
3 The variables: oil prices and global M2 are deflated by the United States (U.S.)
consumer price index (CPI). The M2 in the four biggest economies (accounting for
65% of the world economy in 2011) is used as a proxy for global liquidity.
4 As indicated by theAugmentedDickey Fuller and confirmedby theDickey Fuller
GLS, the Phillips–Perron and the Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin.are shown the responses of global oil production, global real
aggregate demand, global real price of oil and global real M2 to a
structural (positive) innovation in global oil production. The effect
of an unanticipated supply disruption on global oil production is
very persistent and highly significant. An unanticipated negative
innovation in global oil production does not cause a significant
effect on the real price of oil, but does cause a significant negative
effect on global real aggregate demand. A disruption to global oil
production causes decline in global realM2 that is significant in the
second and third months.
In the second column of Fig. 2 a positive global real aggregate
demand shock has a persistent positive effect on global oil
production that is statistically significant between the third and
eleventh months. An unanticipated global real aggregate demand
expansion has a significant effect on global real aggregate demand
that rises over time. A positive global real activity shock has a
positive effect on real oil prices that is statistically significant for
about five months. A positive shock to global real activity does not
significantly affect global real M2.
The effects of an oil market-specific demand shock are shown
in column 3 of Fig. 2. In the third row of column 3 a positive shock
in oil market-specific demand has a large and persistent positive
effect on the real price of oil. This effect is highly statistically
significant and rises in magnitude over the first three months. An
oil market-specific demand shock is associated with significant
effects on global oil production and significant increases in global
real aggregate demand. A positive oil market-specific demand
shock increases global real M2 in the first months.
In the fourth column are shown the responses of the variables
to structural innovations in global real M2. In response to an
unanticipated increase in global real M2 there are significant and
persistent increases in global oil production and in global real
aggregate demand. After a positive shock to global real M2, an
increase in global oil production builds up over the first five
months and is statistically significant after the third month. The
rise in global real aggregate demand is statistically significant over
all twenty months. The increase in real oil prices is statistically
significant between the fifth and ninth months.
In summary, global real M2 has statistically significant effects
on real oil prices, global aggregate demand and global oil produc-
tion. Many of the other results over 1997:01–2011:12 in Fig. 3
are comparable and similar to those found by Kilian (2009) for
1973:1–2007:12. A brief mention will be made of findings that are
different. Over 1997:01–2011:12 an unanticipated negative inno-
vation in global oil production causes a significant negative effect
on global real aggregate demand, whereas over 1973:1–2007:12
the result is at best marginally significant. A positive oil market-
specific demand shock has a positive significant effect (at one stan-
dard error confidence bands after the second month) on global oil
production over 1997:01–2011:12, but not over 1973:1–2007:12.
3.2. Historical decomposition of real oil price
The cumulative contribution to the real price of oil of the
structural shocks to global oil production, global real aggregate
R.A. Ratti, J.L. Vespignani / Economics Letters 121 (2013) 133–136 135Fig. 2. The impulse response effects of the structural shocks: 1997:01–2011:12. Notes: GO is global oil production, AD is global demand for commodities (RP is real oil
price, GLOM2 is real M2 of U.S., Eurozone, Japan and China. The dashed lines represent one and two standard error confidence bands around the estimates of the coefficients
of the impulse response functions. The confidence bands are obtained using Monte Carlo integration as described by Sims (1980), where 5000 draws were used from the
asymptotic distribution of the VAR coefficient.
Source: From Kilian (2009).demand, oil-specific demand and global real M2 are reported in
Fig. 3, from estimating the SVAR model in Eqs. (1) and (2). 5
The cumulative contributions of structural shocks to real oil price
reported in Fig. 3 are annual averages of the monthly data (the
moving average of the last 12months) to improve the readability of
the plot. The monthly data are not annualized.6 Striking facts from
Fig. 3 are that the cumulative contribution to real oil price of shocks
to global oil production are comparatively small, of shocks to oil-
specific demand are comparatively large, and the contribution to
real oil prices of shocks to global real aggregate demand and global
real M2 are of intermediate and comparable size.
The early part of the period in Fig. 3 reflects the recovery from
the Asian financial crisis and world petroleum consumption re-
turning to strong growth in 1999 and then the onset of recession
in the U.S. beginning in March of 2001. In Fig. 3 the rapid increase
in oil price leading to a peak in June 2008 is associated with posi-
tive global real activity, low spare production capacity, and positive
structural shocks to global real M2.7 The fall in oil price from July
2008 to January 2009 is associated with the global financial crisis
5 Note that in Fig. 3 the cumulative effects of all four shocks on oil price aremostly
positive. An examination shows that this is explained by the realization of shocks in
AD, RP , and GLOM2 being persistently positive in the earlier portion of the sample.
By controlling for the initial condition of the cumulative shocks, a more balanced
contribution to real oil prices is observed.However, results shown in Fig. 3 represent
outcomes that may be an important feature of the data.
6 It should be noted that a reading of 0.01 on the vertical axis in Fig. 3 indicates
a 1% increase in real oil price of oil per month, equivalent to a 12.7% increase at an
annualized rate.
7 On the production side, Hamilton (forthcoming) notes the cumulative
contribution of shocks to real oil price is related to a number of factors. A generalduring late 2008, recession in the U.S. over December 2007 to June
2009, and weak growth in Europe. This is reflected in Fig. 3 in that
the cumulative contribution of structural shocks to global real ag-
gregate demand turn negative in mid-2008 and early 2009. OPEC
decreases production target fromSeptember 2008 to January 2009.
The contribution to real oil price of oil-market specific precaution-
ary demand is also very small or negative at the end of 2008 and
beginning of 2009.
The cumulative impact of global real M2 on the real price of
crude oil is substantial in the recovery of oil price during 2009 and
2010. Cumulative effects of positive structural shocks to global real
aggregate demand contribute to the rise in oil price from January
2009 through April 2011 only through the latter half of the period.
Oil specific precautionary demandmade a cumulative contribution
to real oil prices at the end of 2009 and during 2011.8
strike in Venezuela reduced oil production at the end of 2002 and the beginning
of 2003, and that the U.S. attack on Iraq starting in March 2003 further reduced oil
production. Additional factors contributing to the stagnation of oil production from
2002–2008 include instability in places like Iraq and Nigeria, a fall in production
from the North Sea and from fields in Mexico and Indonesia, and that Saudi
productionwas lower in 2007 than in 2005. During 2011 oil production is disrupted
in Libya and there is political turmoil in several Middle Eastern countries.
8 Our results are robust to different lag structure, alternative monetary aggre-
gates and when different indicator for aggregate demand is used. We note that
our results are similar in magnitude and statistical significance with lag structures
between three to eighteen in the SVAR model, with standard errors become larger
due to reduction of degrees of freedom. Our results are robust to use of global
M1 or global M3 instead of global M2 as monetary aggregate and when OECD
country industrial production (reported by OECD) replaces Kilian’s measure of
global aggregate demand.
136 R.A. Ratti, J.L. Vespignani / Economics Letters 121 (2013) 133–136Fig. 3. Cumulative effect of structural shocks on real price of oil. Notes: GO is global oil production, AD is global demand for commodities, RP is real oil price, GLOM2 is real
M2 of U.S., Eurozone, Japan and China.
Source: From Kilian (2009).4. Discussion and conclusion
There have been substantial increases in liquidity in recent
years and real oil prices have returned to high levels following
the global financial crisis. Unanticipated increases in global real
M2 led to statistically significant increases in real oil prices. The
historical contributions of shocks to global real aggregate demand
and to global real M2 to real oil prices 1997:01–2011:12 are of
comparable size. The historical impact of global real M2 on the real
price of crude oil is important in the recovery of oil price during
2009 and 2010.
Barsky and Kilian (2002) argue that change in monetary policy
regimeswas a key factor behind the oil price increases of the 1970s
and show that the substantial increase in industrial commodity
prices that preceded the increase in oil prices in 1973–1974 is
consistent with the view that rising demand based on increased
global liquidity drove oil prices higher. Alquist et al. (2012) confirm
the Gillman and Nakov (2009) findings that monetary factors
Granger cause oil prices in the post-war period up until 1997. The
issue is whether there is a liquidity effect on oil prices in the lastfew years. It is likely that the real oil price rise is due to real factors
for which real M2 (M1 or M3) is a proxy.
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